National Association of Air Traffic Specialists

Aviation Safety is Our Business

The Case of the Disappearing Controllers

By Hal Gross¹

In 1997, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) completed its long-planned consolidation, begun in 1981, from 318 down to 61 Automated Flight Service Stations (AFSS) nationally. Grouped into nine geographic regions (see Figure 1), the 61 AFSS, together with 17 non-automated facilities (FSS) -- some of which operate seasonally or part-time, and all of which are scattered around Alaska, comprise the Flight Service, a part of the FAA. The AFSS are small facilities, generally sited away from large population centers.

Alaska Region * 1. Fairbanks AFSS, AK 2. Juneau AFSS, AK 3. Kenai AFSS, AK A. Dillingham FSS, AK B. Homer FSS, AK C. Ketchikan FSS, AK D. Palmer FSS, AK E. Sitka FSS, AK F. Talkeetna FSS, AK * Part time/seasonal FSS not included.	Great Lakes Region 16. Cleveland AFSS, OH 17. Dayton AFSS, OH 18. Grand Forks AFSS, ND 19. Green Bay AFSS, WI 20. Huron AFSS, SD 21. Kanakee AFSS, IL 22. Lansing AFSS, MI 23. Princeton AFSS, MN 24. Terre Haute AFSS, IN	Southern Region 35. Anderson AFSS, SC 36. Anniston AFSS, AL 37. Gainesville AFSS, FL 38. Greenwood AFSS, MS 39. Jackson AFSS, TN 40. Louisville AFSS, KY 41. Macon AFSS, GA 42. Miami AFSS, FL 43. Nashville AFSS, TN 44. Raleigh AFSS, NC 45. San Juan AFSS, PR 46. St. Petersburg AFSS, FL
Central Region 4. Columbia AFSS, MO 5. Columbus AFSS, NE 6. Fort dodge AFSS, IA 7. St. Louis AFSS, MO 8. Wichita AFSS, KS	New England Region 25. Bangor AFSS, ME 26. Bridgeport AFSS, CT 27. Burlington AFSS, VT	Southwest Region 47. Albuquerque AFSS, NM 48. Conroe AFSS, TX 49. De Ridder AFSS, LA 50. Fort Worth AFSS, TX 51. Jonesboro AFSS, AR 52. Mc Alester AFSS, OK 53. San Angelo AFSS, TX
Eastern Region 9. Altoona AFSS, PA 10. Buffalo AFSS, NY 11. Elkins AFSS, WV 12. Islip AFSS, NY 13. Leesburg AFSS, VA 14. Millville AFSS, NJ 15. Williamsport AFSS, PA	Northwest Mountain Region 28. Boise AFSS, ID 29. Casper AFSS, WY 30. Cedar City AFSS, UT 31. Denver AFSS, CO 32. Great Falls AFSS, MT 33. McMinnville AFSS, OR 34. Seattle AFSS, WA	Western Pacific Region 54. Hawthorne AFSS, CA 55. Honolulu AFSS, HA 56. Oakland AFSS, CA 57. Prescott AFSS, AZ 58. Rancho Murietta AFSS, CA 59. Reno AFSS, NV 60. Riverside AFSS, CA 61. San Diego AFSS, CA

Figure 1

 All Flight Service air traffic controllers (GS-2152), in addition to regular controller training, are specifically trained to provide weather-related information to pilots, and to help pilots avoid weather-related hazards, including thunderstorms, turbulence and icing. It takes about three years, under normal conditions, to hire and train a flight service controller to perform these services. The regular services provided by Flight Service controllers include filing flight plans, preflight and inflight weather briefings, monitoring air navigation aids and providing en route communications with pilots, assisting pilots in distress, providing pilots with various other services, and conducting vital search and rescue missions. While general aviation pilots constitute the usual clientele for these services, commercial air and military pilots can and frequently do use them.

In February 1972, the National Association of Air Traffic Specialists (NAATS) became and remains the sole union representing the Flight Service controllers. Despite its reservations, NAATS did not oppose consolidation of the Flight Service stations, sharing the FAA’s desire for increased efficiency. However, NAATS views with increasing alarm the steady decline in the number of working controllers remaining in the Flight Service. Figure 2 depicts the fact that the number of controllers working at Flight Service stations has dropped steadily in every year but one since 1981, and is now well-below the 2,650 minimum which both NAATS and the FAA consider safe.

Of about 2,350 controllers who remain in the Flight Service, between 40 and 50 percent are presently eligible to retire. NAATS estimates that a full 80 percent of Flight Service controllers will be eligible for retirement by the year 2002.

Currently, Flight Service controllers are disappearing at the rate of approximately 150 per year. The FAA expects this pace to go on, at least for the next several years.

Several factors contribute to this growing crisis. First, the work force is already about 300 controllers below the safe minimum. Second, replacements are not easily found. Third, both instructors and training slots are severely limited at the FAA Academy, creating a bottleneck limiting the rate at which trainees can receive their mandatory training to become controllers. Fourth, given the three years needed to train a journeyman controller, about 450 trainees must be in the pipeline just to offset annual attrition. At least 300 more must be hired and trained over the same period to restore safety to the system. Yet, the FAA has hired virtually no controllers into the Flight Service in the last ten years.

Given the importance and complexity of this problem, one would expect the FAA to have some solution in mind. Yet, to date the FAA has not presented a plan - credible or not - to address even the anticipated loss of experienced senior controllers, as retirements occur. Clearly, the Flight Service will lose labor, ability, institutional knowledge and experience as senior controllers retire, even if the numbers are replaced. The shortage of controllers is now acute.

While many controllers leave the ranks to avoid job-related stress or to take earned retirement -- normal attrition -- others are transferred into management or supervisory positions, or temporarily detailed into non-controller positions. FAA management has not recognized the effects of steadily diminishing the controller work force below acceptable minimums.

The steady shrinkage in the number of Flight Service controllers has an obvious impact on controller morale. As the Flight Service system depends on fewer and fewer controllers to do the same jobs, the burdens assigned to those who remain become greater, and the stress of this employment increases. Meanwhile, the opportunity to take ordinary paid leave or time off diminishes. Over time, these factors increase the possibility of errors of judgment in this stress-filled and exacting occupation, where an error of judgment can quickly lead to fatalities, sometimes counted in the hundreds. As the number of Flight Service controllers has decreased, the number of general aviation and commercial aviation flights has steadily increased, multiplying the pressures, the number of judgments required by the controllers who remain on the job, and the opportunity for accidents to happen. 

NUMBER of flight service controllers
On December 31 OF:	Number of Flight Service Controllers:
1981	3,576
1982	3,525
1983	3,508
1984	3,499
1985	Not available
1986	Not available
1987	3,119
1988	3,019
1989	3,041
1990	3,037
1991	3,030
1992	3,006
1993	2,883
1994	2,659
1995	2,579
1996	2,456
1997	2,368

Figure 2

Understaffing at many facilities limits the ability of the FAA’s Flight Service System to perform its task. Initially, controllers faced with more pilot calls than a facility can immediately handle must let calls back up. Inevitably, this results in fewer pilots getting necessary information, as some pilots run out of patience, and simply hang up. San Angelo, Texas, a medium-sized facility with twelve fewer controllers than the acceptable minimum, reports that it sometimes loses 12 calls per hour, for example.

As the problem becomes more acute, pilots calls are passed along to another facility, with lower demand. Because the "traffic" depends heavily on local weather, the level of traffic may change abruptly, or the facility to which calls are off-loaded may be at considerable distance from the original facility. The result is that the weather information supplied may be less timely, or less detailed than that from the local facility initially contacted. The opportunities for miscommunication and ambiguities increase when the pilot is in one area and the controller is in another.

In one August 1996 instance, which the FAA classifies as an "operational deviation", a controller at the Lansing, Michigan AFSS was assigned to take a pilot briefing call. The pilot requested clearance to fly to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, "departing Cheboygan." The controller was not informed that the pilot call originated outside the Lansing, Michigan, flight plan area, which includes the Cheboygan, Michigan airport, and proceeded to brief accordingly. However, the pilot, unaware that his call had been transferred to Lansing, Michigan, was located at the Sheboygan, Wisconsin, airport, in the flight plan area of the Green Bay, Wisconsin, AFSS. Fortunately, the ambiguity was resolved before an accident could occur.

The controller involved says, "Transferring pilot briefing calls to another AFSS is dangerous. If it continues, it will eventually cause the deaths of pilots and passengers."

Because the FAA has let the shortage of Flight Service controllers build for so long, understaffing occurs in every region of the country. Figure 3 shows the understaffing of controllers on a station-by-station and regional basis.

Shortage of Flight Service Air Traffic Controllers by Facility, as of June 2, 1998:

 

Region Facility and Location	Current Staffing	Minimum Needed	Shortage
Alaska *	193	201	8
1. Fairbanks AFSS	64	66	2
2. Juneau AFSS	24	27	3
3. Kenai AFSS	86	88	2
A. Homer FSS	4	4	0
B. Ketchikan FSS	8	8	0
C. Palmer FSS	2	2	0
D. Sitka FSS	2	4	2
E. Talkeetna FSS	3	2	-1
* part-time/seasonal FSS not shown
Central	164	187	23
4. Columbia AFSS, MO	48	52	4
5. Columbus AFSS, NE	22	26	4
6. Fort Dodge AFSS, IA	31	36	5
7. St. Louis AFSS, MO	34	37	3
8. Wichita AFSS, KS	29	36	7
Eastern	285	311	26
9. Altoona AFSS, PA	48	48	0
10. Buffalo AFSS, NY	30	33	3
11. Elkins AFSS, WV	28	31	3
12. Islip AFSS, NY	39	44	5
13. Leesburg AFSS, VA	59	63	4
14. Millville AFSS, NJ	35	44	9
15. Williamsport AFSS, PA	46	48	2
Great Lakes	389	439	50
16. Cleveland AFSS, OH	42	58	16
17. Dayton AFSS, OH	41	43	2
18. Grand Forks AFSS, ND	26	26	0
19. Green Bay AFSS, WI	50	52	2
20. Huron AFSS, SD	22	22	0
21. Kanakee AFSS, IL	52	60	8
22. Lansing AFSS, MI	56	68	12
23. Princeton AFSS, MN	52	54	2
24. Terre Haute AFSS, IN	48	56	8
New England	105	129	24
25. Bangor AFSS, ME	28	32	4
26. Bridgeport AFSS, CT	47	61	14
27. Burlington AFSS, VT	30	36	6
Northwest Mountain	227	245	18
28. Boise AFSS, ID	24	24	0
29. Casper AFSS, WY	23	24	1
30. Cedar City AFSS, UT	29	32	3
31. Denver AFSS, CO	46	51	5
32. Great Falls AFSS, MT	31	21	0
33. Mc Minnville AFSS, OR	25	35	0
34. Seattle AFSS, WA	49	58	9
Southern	424	534	90
35. Anderson AFSS, SC	38	46	8
36. Anniston AFSS, AL	35	42	7
37. Gainesville AFSS, FL	38	50	12
38. Greenwood AFSS, MS	19	26	7
39. Jackson AFSS, TN	23	28	5
40. Louisville AFSS, KY	24	32	8
41. Macon AFSS, GA	43	50	7
42. Miami AFSS, FL	57	65	8
43. Nashville AFSS, TN	30	40	10
44. Raleigh AFSS, NC	40	50	10
45. San Juan AFSS, PR	14	24	10
46. St. Petersburg AFSS, FL	63	68	5
Southwest	282	319	37
47. Albuquerque AFSS, NM	40	40	0
48. Conroe AFSS, TX	39	45	6
49. De Ridder AFSS, LA	25	35	10
50. Fort Worth AFSS, TX	70	72	2
51. Jonesboro AFSS, AR	33	37	4
52. Mc Alester AFSS, OK	39	42	3
53. San Angelo AFSS, TX	36	48	12
Western Pacific	277	295	18
54. Hawthorne AFSS, CA	35	38	3
55. Honolulu AFSS, HA	19	23	4
56. Oakland AFSS, CA	40	47	7
57. Prescott AFSS, AZ	46	48	2
58. Rancho Murieta AFSS, CA	37	37	0
59. Reno AFSS, NV	30	30	0
60. Riverside AFSS, CA	39	41	2
61. San Diego AFSS, CA	31	31	0
	Current Staffing	Minimum Needed	Shortage
TOTALS	2,346	2,660	314

Figure 3

The FAA has not only failed to deal with this growing problem, but it has also attempted to mask its existence. The number of Flight Service controllers is seldom shown separately in FAA statistics. Rather, controllers are lumped in with managers, supervisors, administrative personnel, persons on detail or extended leave, and others to produce a Flight Service total. By counting this large number of people as Flight Service personnel, the FAA masks the considerable drop in the number of controllers since 1981, and the rate at which controller numbers have declined in comparison with supervisory and administrative personnel. Figure. 4 differentiates controllers from non-controllers among Flight Service personnel between 1981 and 1995, to show how nearly all reductions in Flight Service personnel over the same period have been controllers.

FAA Flight Service Station Staffing

1981 – 1995 (on December 31) 

Year:	81	82	83	84	85*	86*	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	Change 81-95
Controllers (GS-2152):	3576	3525	3508	3499	*	*	3119	3019	3041	3037	3030	3006	2883	2659	2579	(997)
Supervisory, Manager, Other Personnel:	929	797	836	824	*	*	1098	1113	1075	1113	1137	1111	1076	951	923	(6)
Totals:	4505	4322	4344	4323	4423	4361	4217	4132	4116	4150	4167	4117	3959	3610	3502	(1003)

* No job classification data available for these two years.

Figure 4

In its budget request for this year, the Department of Transportation seeks funding for 90 fewer Flight Service controllers for FY 2000. The Flight Service controller workforce, through attrition, is disappearing at an alarming rate.

The problems that the FAA faces are not new. The Agency began operation on December 31, 1958, replacing the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA). By that time, the CAA had been understaffed and underfunded for over 20 years. The FAA was functioning without adequate radar surveillance technology, and was being overwhelmed by rapid increases in air traffic. Congressional interest was elsewhere, until a United Airlines flight and a TWA Super Constellation collided over the Grand Canyon, killing more than 120 people on the two planes. Investigation revealed that the CAA did not have enough airways, airspace or controllers to offer positive separation to all aircraft flying across the country. The CAA claimed inability to purchase sufficient radar navigation aids or hire sufficient controllers, because of lack of funds. After the accident investigation was completed, the CAA requested and Congress appropriated $250 million to upgrade the airway system, double available navigation aids, open 40 new control towers, and hire 1,400 additional controllers.

In the spring of 1958, an Air Force jet collided with a United Air Lines DC-7 near Las Vegas, killing 47. Less than a month later, an Air National Guard jet collided with a Capital Airlines turboprop, killing 12.

While the FAA was in the process of getting organized, on December 16, 1960, a United DC-8 and a TWA Super Constellation collided over New York City, killing 128 on the two planes and eight on the ground. President Kennedy, in March 1961, established the Project Beacon task force to study the air traffic control system and recommend improvements.

The task force found that the FAA had many projects in development, with no overall direction or coordination to guide them. Much of the agency’s research was based on a report issued 20 years earlier, and some research and development was focusing on technically advanced equipment, while little work was being done on short-range problems that needed immediate attention. The task force recommended the development of what became the flight data processing (FDP) system. It also recommended a computer-driven display system to identify aircraft, altitude and airspeed directly on the radar scope.

The FAA eventually responded to Project Beacon’s recommendations, but at a much slower pace than the task force had recommended. In 1968, the union representing tower controllers (PATCO) charged the FAA with unnecessarily delaying the installation of sufficient air traffic control equipment and with not hiring enough new air traffic controllers to operate the nation’s air traffic control system. In 1968, PATCO controllers organized a strict "work to the rule" slowdown, and in 1970 a controller sick-out, in which 2,000 controllers participated. As a result, the FAA requested and Congress appropriated additional funds to accelerate the installation of many of the automated systems recommended by the Project Beacon task force. Even so, the FAA remained years behind the planned acquisition schedule.

The air traffic control problems of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s sound remarkably like the problems Flight Service controllers face in the late 1990’s: low morale inspired by poor FAA management, understaffing, and underfunding. New technology has come along, but the FAA still must be compelled by the Congress to acquire it, reluctantly and always years after it is available, as it nears obsolescence. The FAA continues to blame Congress for not appropriating sufficient funds, but usually has not requested the funds it needs. Controllers are compelled to work with obsolescent equipment, as an understaffed workforce, because of poor FAA planning and management.

The FAA is not listening or concerned. Unfortunately, NAATS must turn its efforts to gaining the attention of Congress and user groups toward these obvious problems. The necessary solutions need to be quickly implemented including hiring new personnel, on a steady and sustained basis, into the Flight Service option.

# # #

¹The writer is the Legislative Representative of the National Association of Air Traffic Specialists (NAATS). Comments on this article may be sent to President Wally Pike, at NAATS, 11303 Amherst Avenue, Suite 4, Wheaton, MD 20902.

2 See Nolan, Michael S., Fundamentals of Air Traffic Control, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1990, p. 25 ff.

 

Walter W. Pike, President

This page was last updated on 1 June, 2000