S
tatement ofWalter W. Pike,President
National Association of AirTraffic Specialists
(NAATS)
submitted to the
United States House of Representatives
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Aviation
Washington, DC
August 9, 1999
Chairman Duncan and Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Walter W. ("Wally") Pike. I am completing my first year as President of the National Association of Air Traffic Specialists (NAATS). I have worked for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for thirty years, and in air traffic control continuously since 1973, with assignments at Fort Worth, Childress, and San Antonio, Texas, and at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
At the same time, I have been a NAATS union official since 1979, serving in various capacities.
Im pleased that the subcommittee is holding this oversight hearing on aviation operations during severe weather, and grateful for the opportunity the subcommittee has provided to me to submit this testimony to you.
NAATS is one of three nationally-recognized federal labor unions representing FAA workers. Since 1957, NAATS has been the exclusive bargaining agent for the Flight Service air traffic controllers, who now number less than 2,350 journeymen, more than three hundred controllers short of what we consider a safe minimum, among some 3,000 Flight Service personnel.
It is necessary to distinguish NAATS from our sister union, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). NATCA is both far larger, and because its members work primarily in the towers and en route centers serving large commercial airports, far better known that we are. Nevertheless, our controllers are the FAAs weather experts!!!
Although both sets of controllers receive similar training, NAATS controllers additionally are specifically trained to provide information to help pilots avoid weather-related hazards, including thunderstorms, turbulence and icing. It takes about three years to train a journeyman Flight Service controller. It is fair to say that NATCA controllers main task is to maintain separation between the large commercial airliners on which most civilian airline passengers fly, while NAATS controllers main task is to keep general aviation aircraft from the weather dangers around them.
While flying continues to be a relatively safe mode of transportation, and has shown modest improvement in safety in recent years, the nearly constant increase in air traffic and the inability of the FAA to keep pace with technology developments in timely fashion continue to put general aviation pilots and their passengers at some risk.
According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) between 1989 and 1997 there were 17,659 aircraft accidents. Weather was a causal or contributing factor in 3,976 of these accidents (22.5%). When one considers only general aviation aircraft, over the same period15,289 accidents occurred, of which 3,510 were weather-related, a slightly higher percentage (23.0%). The weather-related factors included wind, visibility or ceiling problems, and icing.
Almost all significant weather that affects aviation occurs either on the surface or from the surface up to about 15,000 feet in altitude. Ill refer to this area as the "red zone." While large commercial aircraft transcend this area, general aviation, with a few exceptions, mostly flies in this area. While commercial planes do have weather-related accidents in the red zone, like the recent case at Little Rock, Arkansas, most commercial flights take place at higher altitudes and the planes have the capability and speed to avoid hazardous weather conditions. Large planes can and do fly around thunderstorms and change altitude to avoid icing and turbulence. Smaller, lighter craft cannot make such dramatic changes in flight to avoid hazardous weather, and generally must modify their flight plan to avoid anticipated weather problems before the flight takes place. Thus, the significance of the preflight weather briefing is clear.
Ultimately, the pilot is responsible for the safety of his craft and passengers. Improvements in the system can only help those pilots and aircraft that bring themselves within the system. Since 1978, general aviation pilots flying under visual flight rules (VFR) have not been required to file a flight plan or to get a preflight weather briefing. The NTSB reports that almost half of the general aviation flights involved in weather-related accident had no record of receiving a preflight weather briefing. Meanwhile, the FAA reports that "weather causes 35 per cent of all aviation fatalities and 73% of all delays in excess of 15 minutes.
Perhaps, Congress will want to reconsider the decision to permit pilots to take off under VFR conditions without a preflight weather briefing and without filing a flight plan, as apparently John F. Kennedy, Jr. did in his recent tragic last flight. The questions about that particular flight will take months of investigation by the NTSB to resolve. But, it is already clear that filing a flight plan would have triggered a search hours earlier, and that a preflight weather briefing may have persuaded the pilot to take a safer, overland route to Marthas Vineyard, perhaps avoiding the condition that may have caused his accident. The pilot apparently relied upon a non-FAA certified Internet weather forecast for a flight from Teterboro, New Jersey to Hyannis, Massachusetts, obtained at 6:30 p.m. The report was for VFR weather and visibility of 6 to 8 miles. No AIRMETS (meteorological reports to airmen) or SIGMETS (reports of significant meteorological conditions) were issued for the route of flight, and all airports along the route of flight reported visual meteorological conditions.
However, pilots who flew over Long Island Sound that evening later reported that in flight visibility over the water was significantly reduced.
While the philosophical basis for the decision to remove the requirement of a preflight weather briefing is clear, it is equally clear that the lives of more than pilots are at state, including passengers who may have had no part in the pilots decisions.
The Kennedy accident illustrates the principle that VFR conditions can quickly become instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. Kennedys Piper Saratoga took off at 8:38 p.m., at sunset, and soon encountered coastal haze and darkness, which at least partially affected his ability to navigate. Apparently, Kennedy was not rated to fly in IFR conditions.
Under applicable FAA rules, clearly spelled out in the Aeronautical Information Manual, an emergency can be either a "distress" or an "urgency" condition, as defined in the Pilot/Controller Glossary. An aircraft is in at least an urgency condition the moment the pilot becomes doubtful about position, fuel endurance, weather, or any other condition that could adversely affect flight safety. This is the time to ask for help, the manual specifies, not after the situation has developed into a distress condition. Pilots who become apprehensive about their safety for any reason are enjoined to "request assistance immediately."
Radar equipped air traffic control (ATC) facilities can provide radar assistance and vectors to VFR aircraft in difficult when the pilot can talk with the controller and the aircraft is within radar coverage. The additional guidance information is advisory, and the pilot remains responsible for flying the aircraft safely. Experience has shown that many pilots who are not qualified for instrument flight cannot maintain control of their aircraft when they encounter clouds or other reduced visibility conditions. Often the controller will not know whether flight into instrument conditions will result from ATC instructions. To avoid possible hazards, a pilot in difficulty is instructed to keep the controller advised of current weather conditions being encountered and the weather along the course ahead, and, alternatively,
If a course of action is available which will permit flight and a safe landing in VFR weather conditions, non-instrument rated pilots should choose the VFR condition rather than requesting a vector or approach that will take them into IFR weather conditions, or
If continued flight in VFR conditions is not possible, the non-instrument rated pilot should so advise the controller, indicate the lack of an instrument rating, and declare a distress condition, or
If the pilot is instrument rated and current, and the aircraft is instrument equipped, the pilot should so indicate by requesting an IFR flight clearance. Assistance will then be provided on the basis that the aircraft can operate safely in IFR weather conditions.
While the weather conditions involved with the Kennedy flight could not be considered severe, the Saratoga is capable of cruising at more than 200 miles per hour. At that speed, as Time magazine has observed, "Things can go wrong in a hurry."
The primary source of a preflight weather information is an individual briefing from a weather briefer at an Automated Flight Service Station (AFSS) or a Flight Service Station (FSS). Alternative sources of weather information exist, such as a national weather service briefer, but they do not provide aeronautical information, such as NOTAM's (Notices to airmen) or flow control advisories. Whether or not Congress requires every general aviation pilot to file a flight plan and obtain a preflight weather briefing under VFR conditions, we believe that a trained and properly-equipped Flight Service controller should be immediately available to any general aviation pilot seeking a preflight on in flight briefing.
At the moment, chronic, nationwide understaffing of Flight Service controllers makes it difficult to maintain that standard. The shortage of controllers at some facilities insures that a pilot seeking a preflight briefing will be required to wait his turn, which in turn discourages pilots from seeking the briefing. The FAA's reaction to this widespread problem is to transfer the calls to an available controller in another region. But the second controller may be less familiar with the local conditions faced by the pilot, and have less timely information on local weather. NAATS believes it is time to bring the number of Flight Service controllers up to the acceptable minimum, 2,650 controllers, and certainly to avoid the cut of 90 controllers proposed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) over FAA objection in the FY 2000 budget request.
Along with the need to maintain an adequate number of trained Flight Service controllers, the FAA, and, ultimately, the Congress, needs to provide the controllers with the available equipment needed to improve air safety and avoid weather-related hazards.
Under pressure from the Congress, the FAA, after years of delay and procrastination, gradually accepted the idea that it must replace its long-obsolete Model 1 Full Capacity (M1FC) automation system, now used by Flight Service controllers. The replacement technology is called the Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS). OASIS is based on off-the-shelf technology. But, the FAA chose to install it in fits and starts. By the time installation was to begin, some of the limitations of the new technology had become obvious. Working with NAATS representatives, and the contractors, the FAA has sent the OASIS software back to the contractors for further development. Although the modifications come late in the game, and will further delay the installation of OASIS, NAATS appreciates these changes, which will vastly improve the capability of Flight Service controllers to do the job. OASIS will pay for itself within three years after it is installed. Presently, the first installation and test acceptance of the improved OASIS is tentatively planned for March, 2000.
Meanwhile, OMB predicts an increase in workload volume in excess of 25% for Flight Service stations from FY 1999 to FY 2000.
Included in the improved OASIS package will be the Direct User Access Terminal System (DUATS), which will permit a pilot to obtain the same raw weather data on which the controller bases his analysis and interpretations. While this may be enough for some pilots, and will improve pilot-controller communications, it remains to be seen whether direct access to the weather data will significantly reduce the need for analysis and interpretation. NAATS does not believe that a significant reduction will occur.
Further improvements in technology are presently available to improve the capacity of Flight Service controllers to assist pilots. Flight Service controllers presently use a variety of graphic displays on their computer screens to locate weather and other in flight hazards as they work with pilots. The information ranges from weather frontal activity and movements, NEXRAD (next generation radar) information, composite radar data, forecast outlooks, AIRMETS, SIGMETs, convective SIGMETS and severe weather warnings, NOATAM's, and military airspace activities. Presently, the FAA has not provided Flight Service controllers with the technology needed to display on their computer screens accurate aircraft positions relative to weather and other in-flight hazards.
When a pilot reports coordinates indicating his position, the controller must estimate the location and proximity to hazards, and then recommend a route for deviation. The quality of the controller's recommendation necessarily depends on the accuracy of the controller's estimate of the pilot's position.
At the recent Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) Fly-In at Oshkosh, Wisconsin, NAATS provided a "proof of concept" for WAND (Weather Avoidance Navigational Displays). WAND, which is presently available, uses a computer mouse to position a cursor to provide latitude and longitude coordinates from the GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) to pinpoint an aircraft's position, and assure the accuracy of recommended routes to avoid weather and other hazards. NAATS believes that WAND or some other aircraft situational display would, if added to Flight Service technology, make a major improvement to help pilots avoid severe weather and other hazards.
NAATS controllers look forward to the time, hopefully in the very near future, when they can use these available tools to provide additional safety to pilots and their passengers.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the subcommittee for permitting us to submit our testimony. We will gladly answer any questions which Members may have, which may be forwarded to me at NAATS Headquarters, 11303 Amherst Avenue, Suite 4, Wheaton, Maryland 20902 (phone: 301-933-6228; fax: 301-933-3902) or to our legislative representative, Hal Gross, at 6417 Fifth Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22312 (phone: 703-256-2784; fax: 703-941-3139).
We look forward to working with the Congress, and in partnership with the FAA, to promote aviation safety and services. Aviation safety is our business.
MAIN INDEX | INFORMATION | CONSTITUTION | PRESS RELEASES |
RECENT UPDATES | NEWSLETTERS | CONTRACT | POLITICS |
RENAISSANCE | NEWS ARTICLES | FACREP HELPS | HUMOR |
MY NOTES | LETTERS to MEMBERS | LINKS | NATIONAL/REGIONAL REPS |
This page was last updated on 24 November, 2000